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Non‐Technical Summary 
Governments  are  subject  to  a  number  of  constraints  that  affect  their  ability  to  set  fiscal  policy 
optimally. This paper considers two. Firstly, governments are  inevitably  imperfectly  informed about 
the production technology of firms and household preferences which both determine what level and 
what  composition of public  spending  are optimal.  Secondly, governments are  constrained  in  their 
ability to change various elements of fiscal policy, due to, for example, quasi‐fixed expenditure items 
such as social welfare benefits  linked to entitlement conditions and  interest payments that depend 
on the stock of public debt accumulated in the past. Other factors that constrain governments in this 
respect  include  limited  administrative  capacity  (governments  are  only  able  to  concentrate  on  a 
limited number of issues at a time) and limited political capital required for fiscal changes. We refer 
to this type of constraint as budget rigidities.  
In  this  paper we  derive  the  optimal  level  and  the  optimal  composition  of  public  spending  in  the 
situation in which governments are constrained in their ability to alter both and know little about the 
relative growth benefits of different public spending categories. As a theoretical framework, we use 
endogenous growth models with public finance in which fiscal policy affects the long‐run growth rate 
of  the  economy.  Previous  papers  that  have  used  this  class  of  models  typically  ignore  these 
constraints on governments, and assume that private and public inputs are substitutes.  
We generate a number of interesting results with respect to optimal fiscal policy in the presence of 
budget  rigidities,  informational  limitations,  or  both  in  the  realistic  case  when  private  and  public 
inputs to private production that are provided by the government are complements. First, we show 
that  the  optimal  level  of  productive  public  spending  and  the  composition  are  interrelated:  in 
particular,  the  optimal  level  of  spending  is  higher  when  the  composition  is  suboptimal,  and  the 
optimal share of public resources allocated to public investment may be very low when the level of 
spending is either too high or too low due to budget rigidities. This result contrasts with the common 
perception  that  public  investment  is  the  most  important  public  spending  category  for  long‐run 
growth. 
Secondly, we show that imperfect knowledge of the government is much more likely a constraining 
factor  for  fiscal  policy with  complementarity.  The  number  of  parameters  that  determine  optimal 
fiscal policy increases compared to the case when public and private inputs are substitutes, and some 
model parameters which  are  commonly perceived not  to  impact on optimal  fiscal policy  in  some 
cases are  shown  to play  indeed a  role. These  results demonstrate  that determining optimal  fiscal 
policy  even  under  growth  maximization  is  highly  complex  in  practice  since  for  some  of  these 
parameters robust empirical estimates are not available and again contrast with the more simple but 
likely unrealistic case of substitutability.  
The  third contribution  is  to analyze  fiscal  reform when governments are  imperfectly  informed and 
when budget rigidities  imply that the government  is only able to  implement piecemeal fiscal policy 
changes which take the existing fiscal policy as its starting point. Given that the optimal fiscal policy 
parameter values are unknown, the optimal size and direction of fiscal policy parameter changes are 
both unclear. We  then  show  that by  limiting  the magnitude of policy parameter  changes, budget 
rigidities  in fact reduce  informational requirement so that  in most situations, the design of optimal 
fiscal reform only requires  information about the direction of change but not about  its magnitude. 
We  further  stress  the  need  for  better  information  by  showing  that  with  complementarity,  fiscal 
reforms are more likely to reduce rather than to augment long‐run growth. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Regierungen  unterliegen  Rahmenbedingungen,  die  ihre  fiskalpolitischen  Handlungsmöglichkeiten 
erheblich  einschränken  können.  Diese  Studie  berücksichtigt  solche  Rahmenbedingungen,  die  auf 
verschiedenen Ebenen liegen. Regierungen verfügen nur über unvollständige Informationen. Das gilt 
gleichermaßen  für  die  von  den  Unternehmen  verwandte  Produktionstechnologie  wie  für  die 
Präferenzen  der  privaten  Haushalte,  beides  wichtige  Parameter  für  die  optimale  Höhe  und 
Zusammensetzung  von  Staatsausgaben.  Zudem  ist  der  Spielraum  für  fiskalpolitische  Reformen 
begrenzt.  So  sind große Ausgabenblöcke wie  z.B.  im Sozialbereich gesetzlich  festgelegt und  lassen 
sich  nur  bedingt  ändern,  und  die  Höhe  von  Zinszahlungen  hängt  von  den  in  der  Vergangenheit 
akkumulierten  Schulden  ab.  Politische  Restriktionen  können  sich  zudem  aus  administrativen 
Kapazitätsengpässen  der  Regierung  oder  dem  Mangel  an  politischem  Kapital,  das  für  Reformen 
benötigt wird, ergeben. Beides zusammen führt zu budgetärer Starrheit. 
Die  Studie  bestimmt  die  optimale Höhe  und  die  optimale  Zusammensetzung  von  Staatsausgaben 
unter  diesen  Rahmenbedingungen.  Unsere  Untersuchung  basiert  auf  einem  endogenen 
Wachstumsmodell,  wonach  Fiskalpolitik  die  langfristige  Wachstumsrate  der  Volkswirtschaft 
beeinflusst. Bisherige Arbeiten, die solche Modelle benutzen, ignorieren zumeist diese Restriktionen 
und unterstellen, dass private und öffentliche Inputs für private Produktion Substitute sind.  
Die Resultate der Studie lassen sich wie folgt zusammenfassen. Erstens zeigen wir, dass die optimale 
Höhe und Zusammensetzung der Staatsausgaben interdependent sind. Die optimale Höhe staatlicher 
Ausgaben  steigt,  wenn  die  Zusammensetzung  suboptimal  ist,  und  der  optimale  Anteil  von 
öffentlichen  Investitionen  im Gesamtbudget  sinkt, wenn die  Summe der  Staatsausgaben  aufgrund 
budgetärer  Starrheit  nicht  dem  optimalen  Niveau  entspricht.  Das  macht  die  weitverbreitete 
Annahme  fraglich,  wonach  öffentliche  Investitionen  die  wichtigste  Ausgabenkategorie  für 
langfristiges Wachstum sind.  
Zweitens  zeigen  wir,  dass  unvollständige  Information  von  der  Regierung  mit  größerer 
Wahrscheinlichkeit eine Beschränkung bei Komplementarität darstellt. Die Anzahl der Parameter, die 
die  optimale  Fiskalpolitik  bestimmen,  ist  signifikant  höher  als  in  dem  Fall,  wenn  öffentliche  und 
private  Inputs  Substitute  sind. Unsere Analyse  zeigt  außerdem, dass  einige Modellparameter,  von 
denen bisher allgemein angenommen wird, dass  sie  in einigen  Fällen  keine Rolle  für die optimale 
Fiskalpolitik  spielen,  doch  von  den  Regierungen  berücksichtigt  werden  müssen.  Diese  Ergebnisse 
demonstrieren,  dass  die  Bestimmung  optimaler  Fiskalpolitik  unter  dem  Ziel  der 
Wachstumsmaximierung  komplex  ist,  insbesondere,  da  oftmals  keine  robusten  Schätzungen  der 
Modellparameter vorliegen. Die Ergebnisse unterscheiden sich außerdem vom ‐ unrealistischen ‐ Fall, 
wenn Inputs Substitute sind.  
Drittens analysieren wir fiskalpolitische Reformen bei unvollständiger Information der Regierung und 
bei  budgetärer  Starrheit,  die  impliziert,  dass    der  Ausgangspunkt  für  Reformen  die  bestehende 
Fiskalpolitik ist, so dass Pfadabhängigkeit vorliegt. In dieser Situation ist sowohl die optimale Höhe als 
auch die optimale Richtung von Änderungen fiskalpolitischer Parameter unbekannt. Die Studie zeigt, 
dass  in  diesem  Fall  die  Regierung  vor  allem  Informationen  zu  der  optimalen  Richtung  von 
Parameteränderungen benötigt. Wir heben zudem die Wichtigkeit von besseren  Informationen der 
Regierung hervor  indem wir  zeigen, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass  fiskalpolitische Reformen  zu 
niedrigerem Wachstum führen, über 50 v.H. liegt.   
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1 Introduction
Governments are subject to a number of constraints that a¤ect their ability
to set scal policy optimally. This paper considers two. Firstly, govern-
ments are inevitably imperfectly informed about the production technology
of rms and household preferences. The importance of imperfect information
for macroeconomic policy more generally is increasingly recognized. In the
context of monetary policy, Greenspan (2004, p.39) notes that policymakers
often have to act, or choose not to act, even though we may not fully under-
stand the full range of possible outcomes, let alone each possible outcomes
likelihood. Phelps (2007, p.xix) proposes that issues have to be rethought
in a way that makes the ever-imperfect knowledge of [...] policymakers an
integral part of the analysis.1 In relation to scal policy, imperfect infor-
mation is also often seen as an important source of second-best situations
(Lipsey (2007)). Since Lipsey and Lancaster (1956), it is well known that
second-best interactions may imply that rst-best policies are not desirable,
and that the rules for optimal policy change. There is a large literature
on optimal taxation and other issues in public economics which addresses
second-best problems. However, the existing literature on optimal taxation
typically assumes that public spending requirements are exogenously given
(Renström (1999)).
Secondly, governments are constrained in their ability to change various
elements of scal policy, due to, for example, quasi-xed expenditure items
such as social welfare benets linked to entitlement conditions, interest pay-
ments that depend on the previously accumulated stock of public debt, and
the wages of public employees. Mattina and Gunnarsson (2007) estimate
that the share of spending that is non-exible due to legal obligations (which
includes social benets, interest payments, compensation of public employ-
ees, and subsidies) amounts to 72% in Slovenia. This gure may even be an
underestimate of the true extent of non-exible public spending: the ability
of the government to change scal policy is also constrained by limited ad-
1Frydman and Goldberg (2007) provide an excellent survey of the evolution of the
notion of imperfect knowledge in macroeconomics.
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ministrative capacity (governments are only able to concentrate on a limited
number of issues at a time) and by limited political capital required for scal
changes (most public spending categories have beneciaries and hence lob-
bies that may oppose change and therefore try to inuence policy makers).
We refer to this type of constraint as budget rigidities. Given the underlying
causes of budget rigidities, it seems plausible that they persist in the long
run.
In this paper we consider the impact of budget rigidities and imperfect
knowledge on optimal scal policy, specically the optimal level and the op-
timal composition of public spending, using an endogenous growth models
with public nance under growth maximization.2 Given that governments
may be constrained in their ability to alter either total productive public
spending or its mix and may know little about the relative growth benets of
di¤erent public spending categories, these models, because they allow for the
inclusion of the productive e¤ects of several public spending categories, of-
fer a potentially interesting addition to the literature.3 This paper therefore
extends the endogenous growth-public nance literature by explicitly con-
sidering imperfect information and budget rigidities as constraints for the
government. In some ways, it is similar to García Peñalosa and Turnovsky
(2005) who consider enforcement problems as an alternative constraint on
scal policy which makes capital income taxation desirable in contrast to a
rst-best situation where in the long run, it is optimal to completely shift
the burden from factor income taxation from capital to labor.
The model we develop considers two distinct productive public spend-
ing categories, public services and public capital, so that the level of public
2As shown by Misch et al. (2008a), growth maximization is often a reasonable close
proxy of welfare maximization and often easier to compute.
3Despite their prevalence in practice and despite the fact that they give rise to the
possibility of second-best outcomes, informational limitations and budget rigidities have
not previously been considered in models of this type. Existing papers instead derive the
rules for the optimal volume and composition of public spending in the absence of such
constraints on government. The only implicit constraint that these models impose on the
government is the fact that lump sum taxation is not available and that economic agents
take taxes and public spending as given so that we consider these rules for scal policy
as rst-best. We recognize however that frequently, the unavailability of lump-sum taxes
within a market economy is considered as a source of second-best situations.
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spending does not need to be exogenously xed. The government uses a at
income tax to nance public spending; in this sense, we hold the structure
of taxation constant. Our model di¤ers from those found in the literature in
the sense that it considers various model features introduced separately by
the literature on endogenous growth models with public nance in a single
framework: in the model we develop, the governments provides public ser-
vices and accumulates public capital similarly to Tsoukis and Miller (2003)
and by Ghosh and Roy (2004), private and public inputs are complements as
in Devarajan et al. (1996), the e¢ ciency of public spending is considered as
Agénor (2010) for example, and we model the production of public services
in greater detail similarly to Agénor (2008b) for example.
In this setup, it is realistic to assume that there are essentially information
asymmetries: private agents are perfectly informed in the sense that they
have full knowledge of their preference and technology parameters and that
they obviously observe scal policy. In contrast, governments can reasonably
be assumed to be imperfectly informed about the technology of production
and household preferences in the sense that they do not know their exact
values because exact empirical estimates are often di¢ cult to nd.
From these modications to the standard setup, we generate a number
of interesting results with respect to optimal scal policy in the presence of
budget rigidities, informational limitations, or both. Firstly, in contrast to
the case of CES technology, Cobb-Douglas technology assumed in most en-
dogenous growth models with public nance has counterintuitive implications
when either the level of public spending or the composition of public spend-
ing is xed due to budget rigidities, or when public spending is not e¢ cient
under the objective of growth maximization. As a simple example, consider
the case when there is one public expenditure category with productive ef-
fects and one that is not productive, and when the level of productive public
spending is currently at its growth-maximizing level. Reallocating a greater
share of public resources towards the unproductive public spending category
implies that the level of total public spending is no longer optimal and must
be increased to ensure that the level of productive public spending remains at
its optimum. However, with two di¤erent productive public expenditure cat-
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egories and Cobb-Douglas technology, the growth-maximizing level and the
growth-maximizing composition are independent of each other contrary to
what this simple example would suggest. Further, the technical e¢ ciency of
public spending does not have an impact either. In contrast, when CES tech-
nology is assumed, the optimal level of productive public spending depends
on its composition and vice versa, and the technical e¢ ciency of public spend-
ing matters. In particular, it is shown that the second-best level of taxation
is higher when the composition is suboptimal, and that the second-best share
of public resources allocated to public investment may be very low when the
level of taxation (i.e. the level of public spending) is either below or above
its rst-best level (we assume that a rst-best situation corresponds to the
case where the government is fully informed about all technology and prefer-
ence parameters and where all policy parameters are fully exible). Similar
results arise when public spending is not e¢ cient. These are additional, but
very simple and intuitive, cases of second-best interaction in public nance
that have largely been ignored in the literature. These results are also con-
sistent with Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008) who nd that increasing the share
of current spending at the expense of capital spending is growth-enhancing
using data from developing countries.
Secondly, we show that imperfect knowledge of the government is much
more likely a constraining factor for scal policy under CES technology when
inputs to private production are complements. With Cobb-Douglas technol-
ogy, the standard result is that only share parameters of the production
function of nal output determine the growth-maximizing tax rate (i.e. the
volume of public spending) and the growth-maximizing expenditure compo-
sition. Moving away from the simple Cobb-Douglas case extends the number
of parameters that determine optimal scal policy and thereby increases the
informational requirements. We show that under CES technology and growth
maximization, optimal policy is also determined by preference parameters,
other technology parameters (in addition to the share parameters), and the
stock-ow properties of public inputs (which can be interpreted as the rate
of depreciation of public inputs to private production). These results demon-
strate that determining optimal scal policy even under growth maximization
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is highly complex in practice, and again contrast with the more simple but
likely unrealistic case of Cobb-Douglas technology, in particular since for
some of these parameters robust empirical estimates are not available. This
implies that governments face important informational limitations which in
turn gives rise to a second-best situation where the government is unable to
set scal policy parameters at their rst-best values. The result is also an
obvious analogy to the theory of taxation which demonstrates that even in
simple static tax models, the optimal tax system depends on a wide range
of factors for which it may be di¢ cult to nd empirical counterparts even
when a range of simplifying assumptions is made (Creedy (2009)). These
types of informational limitations are out of bounds for policy makers and
cannot be removed directly so that the second-best situation persists.4 The
fact that the stock-ow properties of public inputs to private production do
not a¤ect growth-maximizing scal policy under Cobb-Douglas technology
whereas they are important under CES technology is another example of why
Cobb-Douglas technology is counterintuitive.
The third contribution is to analyze scal reform when budget rigidities
and imperfect information simultaneously constrain scal policy. In contrast
to above, we now assume that budget rigidities limit the magnitude of scal
policy changes and do not imply that particular scal policy parameters are
completely xed. Therefore, the government can only implement piecemeal
scal policy changes which take the existing scal policy as its starting point.
It is shown that in line with standard second-best theory, designing growth-
enhancing scal reforms is complex because scal policy parameters may have
to be shifted away from their rst-best to their second-best values. However,
based on our previous arguments, the optimal scal policy parameter values
are unknown in practice so that the optimal size and the optimal direction
of scal policy parameter changes are both unclear. We then show that by
limiting the magnitude of policy parameter changes, budget rigidities in fact
reduce informational requirement so that in most situations, the design of
4In this sense, the commonly encountered argument which is that in a second-best
situation the government should simply remove the distortion which gives rise to a second-
best situation (Ho¤ (2001)) is not valid in this situation.
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optimal scal reform only requires information about the direction of change
but not about its magnitude. The reason is the concavity of the growth
function which implies that with imperfect knowledge, the expected change
of the growth rate of any scal reform is negative; it is only positive when
there is greater certainty about the direction in which scal parameters must
be changed so that they approach their optimal values. We further stress
the need for better information by showing that with complementarity, even
scal reforms which are relatively modest in size may result in sizeable and
possibly negative changes of the growth rate.
These results have some strong policy implications. First, this new frame-
work suggests that commonly held beliefs about what constitutes optimal s-
cal policy are not valid. In particular, it is shown that household preferences
not only a¤ect the growth rate but also the growth-maximizing policy. This
contrasts with standard models where the growth-maximizing scal policy is
determined only by share parameters, and where governments can therefore
ignore household preferences to set scal policy in a growth-maximizing way.
More importantly, due to second-best interactions in the model, optimal
public investment levels may be very low despite the fact that the output
elasticity of public capital signicantly di¤ers from zero and even though
public investment is often seen as the most important public spending cate-
gory for long-term growth. While our model does not take into account the
indirect e¤ects of public capital as for instance in Agénor (2008b), our results
still suggest that with low levels of revenue collection which is the case in
many developing countries, optimal public investment is much lower than in
a rst-best situation. Second, our results show that the most important in-
formation for scal reform in practice is the direction of the policy parameter
change which is likely easier to obtain than information about its magnitude.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model and de-
rives the equilibrium of the market economy. Section 3 derives optimal scal
policy under the assumption of Cobb-Douglas technology in the absence of
constraints as a benchmark case. Section 4 demonstrates the impact of bud-
get rigidities on optimal scal policy when some (but not all) scal policy
parameters are exogenously set below or above their rst-best levels. Section
7
5 shows that imperfect information is more likely a constraining factor under
CES technology because the optimal scal policy responds to changes of a
range of model parameters including the elasticity of substitution, preference
parameters and the rate of depreciation of public inputs of which exact em-
pirical estimates may not be available. Section 6 simultaneously considers
budget rigidities and imperfect knowledge and analyzes the implications and
the informational requirements of scal reform. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
The public nance growth framework we adopt in the paper is based on De-
varajan et al. (1996). We extend their model by simultaneously considering
public services and public capital as in Tsoukis and Miller (2003) and Ghosh
and Roy (2004), CES technology as in the original model by Devarajan et al.
(1996), the e¢ ciency of public spending as in Agénor (2010) and a production
function of public services in a similar way as Agénor (2008b) for example.
We assume that there is a large number of innitely lived households and
rms that is normalized to one so that rm entry and exit cancel out or do
not occur and population growth is zero.
The representative rm produces a single composite good using private
capital (k) which is broadly dened to encompass physical and human capital,
and two public inputs, G1 and G2, based on CES technology:
y = (k + 1G

1 + 2G

2)
1
 (1)
where , 1 and 2 are share parameters with  = 1 1 2. The productiv-
ity of private capital used by the individual rm therefore positively depends
on G1 and G2 which can be conceived to be provided by di¤erent government
sectors (e.g. education and transport infrastructure). For instance, private
vehicles can be used more productively when the quality of the road network
increases. G1 and G2 are non-rival and provided free of charge to the agents
of the economy.  determines the elasticity of substitution which corresponds
to 1
1  . With  = 0, the production technology is Cobb-Douglas.
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5We recognize that a more general specication of (1) would be a nested CES function
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G1 denotes the amount of productive public services provided by the
government (e.g. public law enforcement, public education services), whereas
G2 denotes the stock of public capital (e.g. public infrastructure) which the
government accumulates through public investment, _G2. In other words,
G1 can be interpreted as a public input to private production which fully
depreciates over one period (i.e. the depreciation rate is 1), and G2 can be
seen as a public input with innite lifetime that does not depreciate at all (i.e.
the depreciation rate is 0). To capture the notion that factors of production
are complements rather than substitutes, it is assumed that   0. This
assumption seems justied when considering that public inputs provided by
the government fundamentally di¤er from private inputs, such that it may be
very costly for rms to substitute for them. For instance, privately generating
electricity is typically much more expensive than using electricity from the
public grid.
The government nances total public expenditure by levying a at tax,
 , on income, and the government budget is assumed to be always balanced.
We further assume that the technical e¢ ciency of public spending may vary.
For instance, ine¢ ciencies arise if the government purchases the inputs for
G1 and G2 at a high price, or if there is waste due to corrupt bureaucrats.
While changing the level of technical e¢ ciency may also involve a resource
cost, we refrain from modelling this in greater detail for simplicity because
this is not needed to derive our main results in later sections.
G1 itself is produced using two di¤erent inputs, GA and GB, which can be
interpreted as sub-sectoral public spending categories, based on CES tech-
nology:
G1 = (!G
"
A + G
"
B)
1
" (2)
with ! = 1    and where " determines the elasticity of substitution. This
feature of the model allows for a richer specication of scal policy because
the inter-sectoral allocation (i.e. the allocation of public resources between
G1 and G2) and the sub-sectoral allocation of public resources (i.e. the
that allows for di¤erent elasticities of substitution between G1 and G2 on the one hand
and between G1 and G2 taken together and private capital on the other. However, for the
purpose of this paper, our specication of the production function is su¢ cient.
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allocation of public resources between GA and GB) can be distinguished. It
allows us to analyze the e¤ects of misallocation at the sub-sectoral level on
the growth-maximizing tax rate and the inter-sectoral composition below. In
analogy to the production of nal output, we assume that "  0 reects the
notion that GA and GB, are complements. For simplicity, we set " =  which
facilitates the derivation of the results but does not change them qualitatively.
GA and GB may represent the amounts of goods and services and spending
on public administration used for the production of G1.
Let 1 (2) determine the inter-sectoral allocation of public resources
and denote the share of total public expenditure that is allocated to G1 ( _G2)
with 1+2 = 1 (i.e. the share of resources allocated to public investment is
2 = 1 1) and let A (B) denote the share of public spending on G1 that
is allocated to GA (GB) with A+B = 1. Further, let 1 and 2 denote the
technical e¢ ciency of public spending on G1 and G2 which we assume to be
di¤erent from the allocative e¢ ciency. Gj (with j = A;B) can therefore be
written as
Gj = 11jy (3)
Using (2) and (3), the amount of G1 can therefore be written as
G1 = 11(!
"
A + 
"
B)
1
" y (4)
The level of public investment, _G2, can be written as
_G2 = 22y (5)
We are normalizing ki so that at ki = 1 (with i = 1; 2), public spending
is assumed to be perfectly e¢ cient in a technical sense. For simplicity, we
assume that increasing the e¢ ciency of public spending is possible at no
cost (i.e. increasing ki does not involve a trade-o¤). While in principle, this
means that governments would never choose any value for ki below one in the
absence of budget rigidities, this assumption merely serves as a simplication
and allows asking the hypothetical question about what would happen if
public spending was not perfectly e¢ cient. However, to capture the notion
that e¢ ciency gains are inevitably limited, we assume that 1  1 and that
2  1.
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The households own the rms and therefore receive all their output net of
taxation which they either reinvest in the rms to increase their capital stock
or which they use for consumption depending on their preferences and the re-
turns on private capital. Private investment by the representative household
equals
_k = (1  )y   c (6)
The representative household chooses the consumption path to maximize
lifetime utility U given by
U =
Z 1
0

c1 
1  

e tdt (7)
subject to the households resource constraint given by (6) taking  , G1, G2
and k0 > 0 as given.6 From the rst-order conditions, the growth rate of the
households consumption and of the economy can be written in familiar form
as
 =
_c
c
=
1

((1  )yk   ) (8)
In order to ensure that the transversality condition holds and does not con-
strain the choice of  and 1;2, it is assumed that  > 1.
7
Along the balanced growth path, output can be expressed as
y =
_y

(9)
Using (9) to substitute for y in (5), and integrating, yields
G2 =
22

y (10)
For the remainder of this section, we assume Cobb-Douglas technology
as a means to simplify the analytical expressions. Hence  = 0 (and " = 0),
and the production function can then be written as
y = kG11 G
2
2 (11)
6The time subscript is omitted whenever possible. A dot over the variable denotes its
derivative with respect to time. The initial stock of public capital must also be greater
than zero.
7The transversality condition can be written as lim
t!1[k] = 0 where  is the costate
variable of the current-value Hamiltonian.
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where  = 1  1   2. The marginal product of capital, yk, can be written
as
yk = 

G1
y
1 G2
y
2 y
k
1+2
(12)
Using (4), (10) and (11) to substitute for G1=y, G2=y and y=k in (12), and
using (12) to substitute for yk in (8) yields
 =
1

 
(1  )

(1A)
! (1B)
 11
1


(22)
1

2

  
!
(13)
Note that (13) is not an expression of the growth rate but merely an equation
that the growth rate satises because  also appears on the RHS.
The Appendix shows that the equilibrium of the model is saddlepoint
stable within relevant parameter ranges, and that the balanced growth path
is unique. Along the balanced growth path, c, k, G1, G2 and y all grow at
the same rate.
3 Benchmark Case: Optimal Fiscal Policy with
Cobb-Douglas Technology
This section derives optimal scal policy when output (y) and public services
(G1) are produced using Cobb-Douglas technology and when the government
does not face constraints under the objective of growth maximization. Apart
from the budget constraint and the unavailability of lump-sum taxation, scal
policy is hence not constrained by other factors so that this situation can be
considered as rst-best. This benchmark case will allow us to demonstrate
the role of complementarities and government constraints in later sections.
For simplicity, we assume throughout the paper that the objective of
the government is to maximize growth in contrast to papers that derive
the welfare-maximizing scal policy in similar frameworks as Ghosh and Roy
(2004) for example. While in these models, growth and welfare maximization
are not identical, in practice, growth maximization is less complex and more
common as changes in output are easier to observe than welfare. In addition,
the di¤erences in outcomes between growth and welfare maximization in
12
similar models are often small (Misch et al. (2008a)). Optimal scal policy
therefore refers to the growth-maximizing values of the tax rate and of the
public spending shares of public services and public investment (denoted by
  and 1;2, respectively).
Cobb-Douglas technology implies  = " = 0. Since the model is based on
the assumption that there is no cost to increase e¢ ciency, the government
sets k1;2 at their maximum values 1;2 to ensure that public spending is fully
e¢ cient:
1;2 = 1 (14)
(which obviously maximizes growth and welfare, and which does not depend
on the underlying production technology). Implicitly di¤erentiating (13)
yields the growth-maximizing income tax rate,  , which corresponds to
  = 1 + 2 (15)
, the growth-maximizing inter-sectoral expenditure shares, 1;2, which corre-
spond to
1;2 =
1;2
1 + 2
(16)
where 1 + 

2 = 1, and the growth-maximizing sub-sectoral expenditure
shares within G1, 

A;B, which correspond to
A = ! (17)
and
B =  (18)
(15), (16), (17) and (18) suggest that with Cobb-Douglas technology, the
growth-maximizing tax rate and expenditure shares only depend on share
parameters of the production functions of nal output and of public services.
These results can be seen as representative of the existing literature: Similar
results arise for instance in Agénor (2008a), Agénor (2008b) and Tsoukis and
Miller (2003). They are also directly implied by Barro (1990) and Futagami
et al. (1993) who rst presented endogenous growth models with productive
public service and public capital, respectively.
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These results have important implications with respect to the e¤ects of
government constraints even though we did not consider them in this section.
First, second-best interactions cannot arise in the sense that the optimal level
of taxation, the optimal public spending composition and the e¢ ciency of
public spending are not interrelated. This means for instance that   also
represents the optimal level of taxation if 1;2 6= 1;2 and 1;2 < 1. Therefore,
the consideration of budget rigidities does not yield additional insights under
Cobb-Douglas technology. In contrast, Section 4 demonstrates that with CES
technology, budget rigidities have indeed important implications for optimal
scal policy.
Second, with Cobb-Douglas technology, imperfect information may not
play an important role for optimal scal policy either because the informa-
tional requirements to set scal policy optimally are limited: the calculation
of growth-maximizing scal policy parameter values is straight forward, and
they solely depend on few technology parameters. While their exact values
may not be known, rough estimates of their magnitude are still likely avail-
able which then still enable to obtain reasonable estimates of  , 1;2 and
A;B. With CES technology, it is much more likely that governments are af-
fected by informational constraints as shown in Section 5 because additional
parameters determine optimal scal policy.
4 Optimal Fiscal Policy and Budget Rigidi-
ties
This section analyzes optimal scal policy with CES technology and budget
rigidities and therefore considers a more general setting than the previous
section. We model budget rigidities by assuming that the government is
unable to adjust one or more scal policy parameters which can then be con-
sidered as exogenously given. To some extent, budget rigidities persist in the
long run: Major tax reforms and major reallocations of public resources are
relatively rare events, even over longer time spans. In particular, we consider
four distinct second-best situations. In each of them, one of the four types of
scal policy parameters in the model (we distinguish the technical e¢ ciency
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of public spending determined by i, the rate of taxation  , the inter-sectoral
allocative e¢ ciency determined by i, and the sub-sectoral e¢ ciency of pub-
lic spending determined by j) is exogenously given and cannot be adjusted
by the government due to the presence of budget rigidities.
In the rst three situations, we abstract from the policy problem related
to sub-sectoral allocation within G1 and set  = 0 and A = 1 for simplicity.
In situation 1, the technical e¢ ciency of public spending on G1 is xed at
1 < 1, whereas  and 1;2 are freely adjustable. In situation 2, the level
of taxation is exogenously given and possibly suboptimal so that  6=  
whereas public spending is fully e¢ cient (1;2 = 1) in a technical sense, and
the government sets the expenditure shares 1;2 optimally. In situation 3,
the expenditure shares of G1 and G2 in total public revenue are exogenously
given and possibly suboptimal so that 1;2 6= 1;2 whereas public spending
is fully e¢ cient in a technical sense (1;2 = 1) and  is freely adjustable. In
situation 4, we set 0 <  < 1 and assume that the sub-sectoral expenditure
shares of GA and GB in spending on G1 are exogenously given and possibly
suboptimal so that A;B 6= A;B whereas public spending is fully e¢ cient
(1;2 = 1) in a technical sense and  as well as 1;2 are freely adjustable.
Although in Section 6, we model budget rigidities in greater detail, for the
purpose of this section, it su¢ ces to assume that the government is unable to
address budget rigidities directly and that in each of these cases, they fully
constrain government discretion with respect to the scal policy parameters
in question.
Given that there is no cost to raise e¢ ciency when the e¢ ciency parame-
ters 1;2 are adjustable (situations 2 and 3), their optimal values correspond
to one so that
1;2 = 1 (19)
As discussed above, (15) and (16) imply that under Cobb-Douglas tech-
nology, the growth-maximizing tax rate   and the growth-maximizing ex-
penditure shares 1;2 and 

A;B are independent of each other in the sense
that deviations from the growth-maximizing tax rate have no impact on
the growth-maximizing spending shares and vice versa. In addition, the
sub-sectoral public resource allocations and the technical e¢ ciency of public
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spending neither a¤ect the optimal taxation nor the optimal inter-sectoral
public spending composition.
With CES technology, these results fundamentally change in the sense
that the rst-best tax rate and the rst-best expenditure shares,   and 1;2,
are not necessarily identical to their second-best values denoted by   and
1;2, respectively. As closed-form solutions for the optimal policy parameters
are not available with public capital, public services and CES production
technology for the market economy, we resort to numerical examples to show
that the value of   (1 ) is responsive to changes in 1;2, 1 and A (to
changes in 1;2,  and A). Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 represent the four distinct
second-best situations described in the beginning of this section.
Figure 1 is based on situation 1 and plots the second-best values of  and
1;2 as a function of the e¢ ciency parameter 1 which is exogenously given
and which varies between 0.5 and 1. It demonstrates that when 1 < 1,
the second-best tax rate,  , and the optimal share of resources allocated
to G1, 

1 , exceed the rst-best tax rate, 
, and the rst-best value of 1,
1, respectively. The intuition is that with complementarity of the inputs to
private production, higher levels of taxation and increased resources allocated
to G1 serve to compensate for low public spending e¢ ciency and thereby
prevent the levels of G1 from falling ine¢ ciently low. This is a standard
second-best result: Replicating rst-best policies in a second-best situation
may not be optimal. It can also be shown that the growth rate is still lower
and does not attain its rst-best value.
Figure 2 is based on situation 2 and plots the second-best value of 1,
1 , as a function of  which is exogenous and varies between 0 and 1 so
that it may deviate from  . It likewise demonstrates that when  6=  ,
the optimal share of public resources allocated to G1 (the optimal share of
public resources allocated to public investment, _G2) exceeds (falls short of)
the one in rst-best situations; hence 1 > 

1 (

2 < 

2). The intuition is as
follows. G2 represents the stock of public capital. Current public spending
only a¤ects the additions to the stock of capital and but not the existing
stock of public capital. When  <   and 1 = 

1, G1 drops relatively more
than G2. With complementarity, it is then e¢ cient to allocate a larger share
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of public resources to G1 to mitigate the decrease in overall public resources
available. In the opposite case, when  >   and 1 = 

1, the intuition is
less clear. Given the increase of public resources, the levels of G1 and of G2
are higher compared to the rst-best situation. However, as G2 is a stock
variable, G2 grows faster than G1. With complementarity between G1 and
G2, it is hence e¢ cient to allocate a greater share of public resources to G1
so that 1 > 

1.
Figure 3 is based on situation 3 and plots the second-best value of  ,  ,
as a function of 1 which assumes values between 0 and 1 so that it may
deviate from 1. It likewise demonstrates that when 1 6= 1, the growth-
maximizing level of taxation exceeds the one in a rst-best situation; hence
  >  . The intuition is similar to situation 1 when 1 is set below one.
Under misallocation of public resources at the sectoral level, the overall e¤ec-
tiveness of public spending decreases. With complementarity between private
and public inputs, it is e¢ cient to compensate for this decrease by increasing
the level of taxation (and thereby the level of total public spending).
Figure 4 is based on situation 4 and plots the second-best values of
 and 1, 
 and 1 , as a function of A which is exogenously given.
It demonstrates that under misallocation of resources at the sub-sectoral
level (A 6= A), the growth-maximizing level of taxation and the growth-
maximizing share of resources allocated to G1 exceed the ones in a rst-best
situation (hence   >   and 1 > 

1). The intuition is similar to situation
1: With sub-sectoral misallocation, the supply level of G1 falls. With com-
plementarity between private and public inputs, it is e¢ cient to compensate
for this decrease by increasing the resources available for spending on G1
through higher taxation and through reallocation between G1 and G2.
These results demonstrate that under CES technology with complemen-
tary factor inputs, budget rigidities have important implications for optimal
scal policy. With regard to optimal taxation and public spending compo-
sition, second-best scal policy parameters may signicantly deviate from
their rst-best values. Assuming that in practice, it is unlikely that all scal
policy parameters are set at their rst-best values and that Cobb-Douglas
technology is not common, rst-best policies have little relevance. Determin-
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ing second-best policy parameters is however more complex because they are
not only a¤ected by exogenous model parameters but also by the values of
other policy parameters which hence become interrelated.
In our model, public capital may represent public infrastructure which is
commonly assumed to play an important role in the process of economic de-
velopment. However, even if the share parameter of public capital in private
production signicantly di¤ers from zero (i.e. 2 > 0), the optimal share
of public resources allocated to public capital (2 = 1   1) in second-best
situations may still be relatively small relative to 2 or even close to zero
as shown in Figure 2 depending on the rate of taxation which determines
the level of public spending. In addition, the share of public resources allo-
cated to public investment depends on the sub-sectoral allocation of public
resources within the production of public services (G1) as demonstrated in
Figure 4.
Our results contrast with those of existing papers which do not examine
the impact of budget rigidities of growth-maximizing scal policy. The results
of Ghosh and Roy (2004) are closest to ours and imply that in a model with
Cobb-Douglas technology, public capital and public services, the optimal tax
rate depends on the composition of public spending and vice versa under
welfare maximization. However, they do not discuss this result in detail, and
they do not analyze optimal scal policy in the event when either the tax
rate or the composition of public spending is not set at its rst-best level
which makes their results di¢ cult to compare with ours.
5 Optimal Fiscal Policy and Imperfect Infor-
mation
This section analyzes the determinants of optimal scal policy in the ab-
sence of budget rigidities with CES technology in greater detail and evaluates
whether the assumption of imperfect information is more reasonable under
CES technology compared to the benchmark case with Cobb-Douglas tech-
nology. The previous section has shown that with CES technology, optimal
taxation and public spending composition are not only determined by tech-
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Figure 1: Optimal scal policy as a function of 1
nology parameters as in the case of Cobb-Douglas technology but also by the
settings of the remaining scal policy parameters. In this sense, complexity
increases and imperfect information more likely constrains the government.
We now use numerical examples to analyze whether the growth-maximizing
scal policy parameters are responsive to changes in various exogenous model
parameters which play no role under Cobb-Douglas technology (i.e. which
do not enter (15), (16), (17) and (18)). Figure 5 plots the growth-maximizing
tax rate,  , the growth-maximizing expenditure share of total government
revenue allocated to G1, 

1, and the growth-maximizing sub-sectoral share
of resources allocated to GA, A, as a function of  (which determines the
elasticity of substitution) in a rst-best situation. Given that the slopes de-
viate from zero, Figure 5 suggests that   and 1;2 are highly sensitive to the
choice of the elasticity of substitution. In addition, with  < 0, the stock-
ow properties of the public inputs also impact on the growth-maximizing
scal policy. This can be seen by noting that even though 2 (the share
parameter associated with G2) exceeds 1, the optimal expenditure share 

1
may exceed 0.5 (and hence 2) when  < 0. In contrast, when Cobb-Douglas
technology is assumed and when 2 > 1, (16) implies that 

2 > 

1 always
holds. This is another example of misleading implications of Cobb-Douglas
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Figure 2: Optimal scal policy as a function of 
technology. The intuition is that the level of G2 (which is a stock variable)
is typically higher than the level of G1 (which is only derived from the ow
of public spending). With complementarity, it is then optimal to increase
the share of public resources allocated to G1 and to increase overall public
revenue through higher taxation. Both measures serve to increase the level of
G1. In contrast, the optimal sub-sectoral allocation represented by 

A does
not respond to exogenous changes in  because GA and GB are both derived
from the ow of public spending.
Figures 6 and 7 plot the growth-maximizing tax rate,  , and the growth-
maximizing expenditure shares, 1 and 

A, as a function of  (which de-
termines the householdsintertemporal elasticity of substitution) and of the
discount parameter . Given that the slopes are not zero, it can be seen that
with CES technology, both preference parameters also determine   and 1.
While Figures 6 and 7 suggest that the sensitivity of   and 1 to changes
in  and  is limited because the slope is not steep, this result is still novel.
While under welfare maximization, it seems plausible that household pref-
erences a¤ect optimal scal policy, under growth maximization which is the
case we consider it may be counterintuitive because in our model, scal policy
only directly impacts on private production and income (and not on utility).
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Figure 3: Optimal scal policy as a function of 1
Intuitively, this result directly follows from the model assumptions of com-
plementarity and the fact that the government accumulates public capital.
Complementarity essentially implies that in addition to the share parameters
of the production function and the cost of generating public revenue, it is
the level of private capital which determines the optimal level of the public
inputs. However, the government is unable to manipulate the stock of public
capital directly because contrary to public services, it is not derived from
the ow of public spending but accumulated over time similarly to private
capital. The growth-maximizing rate of public investment therefore depends
on the rate of private investment which in turn can be shown to depend on
preference parameters. This ensures that the level of public capital depends
on the level of private capital as dictated by complementarity. In contrast
and as above, the optimal sub-sectoral allocation represented by A does
not respond to exogenous changes in  and . This means that the alloca-
tion of public resources between two public services solely depends on share
parameters in the production function even with CES technology.
These results further stress that even within simple models and under the
simplifying assumption of growth maximization as the government objective
and in the absence of budget rigidities, setting scal policy in an optimal
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Figure 4: Optimal scal policy as a function of A
way is highly complex. The reason is that optimal scal policy depends on
a range of exogenous model parameters of which robust empirical estimates
may be hard to obtain in practice. While our model is highly abstract and
excludes many features of scal policy, these results nevertheless suggest
that the complexity of determining growth-maximizing scal policy is most
likely to exceed government capacity in practice. In more realistic and hence
more complex models, the range of parameters which determine optimal
scal policy is likely to increase further. Thus, with CES technology, it is
much more reasonable to assume that imperfect information constrains scal
policy so that the government is unable to determine optimal taxation and
expenditure composition.
6 Fiscal Reform with Budget Rigidities and
Imperfect Knowledge
This section simultaneously considers budget rigidities and imperfect knowl-
edge which are both modelled in greater detail and analyzes the implications
of scal reform that takes current scal policy as its starting point using
numerical examples. The previous sections have considered budget rigidities
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Figure 5: Optimal scal policy as a function of 
and imperfect information in isolation of each other. They have shown that
with CES technology, budget rigidities may give rise to important second-
best interactions and that imperfect information is more likely to represent
a problem for governments than in the case of Cobb-Douglas technology.
We now extend the previous sections by assuming that both factors si-
multaneously constrain the government and prevent it from setting the scal
policy parameters at their rst-best values. For simplicity, we again abstract
from sub-sectoral allocation by assuming that  = 0 and A = 1. First, the
government faces informational limitations or imperfect knowledge: while we
assume that the government knows that  , G1 and G2 impact on the growth
rate, that the growth rate is concave in  and 1;2 and that it is increasing in
1;2, it neither knows the rst-best nor the second-best values of  and 1;2.
8
The previous sections showed that with CES technology, optimal scal pol-
8These assumptions mirror the fact that governments still have some knowledge about
private agents even if they do not know the exact values of technology and preference
parameters: economic theory and anecdotal evidence suggest that very low levels of public
spending and very high levels of taxation are detrimental for private investment. It is this
type of evidence that governments are aware of and which implies that optimal scal policy
lies somewhere in between these extremes and that the growth rate is therefore a concave
function. Our notion of imperfect information does therefore not imply that governments
refrain from using scal policy to maximize the growth rate.
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Figure 6: Optimal scal policy as a function of 
icy depends on all model parameters which makes their determination highly
complex even in simple models. At the same time, it seems natural to assume
that government expertise is limited in practice and that exact empirical es-
timates of the model parameters are unknown which both make imperfect
knowledge a reasonable assumption. With unknown   and 1;2, the gov-
ernment does not know whether  and 1;2 are currently set above or below
their rst-best values. Given that there may be second-best interactions as
shown in the previous section, there is no guarantee that adjusting  and 1;2
in the direction of their rst-best values,   and 1;2, enhances growth which
increases complexity even further. In contrast, the government knows that
increasing e¢ ciency always raises the growth rate, and that 1;2 = 1 (which
is reasonable given that there are no cost involved in raising 1;2).
As a starting point, we assume that the economy is currently not at its
growth optimum which implies that the scal policy parameters ( , 1;2 and
1;2) are not set at their rst-best values:
1;2 6= 1;2 (20)
 6=   (21)
1;2 < 1 (22)
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Figure 7: Optimal scal policy as a function of 
where 0 <  < 1 and where 1 + 2 = 1. This implies that  and 1;2 are
set either below or above their growth-maximizing levels, and that public
spending is ine¢ cient since 1;2 < 1. In the case of  and 1;2, the reason
may be imperfect information.
In addition, we assume that the government faces budget rigidities. In
contrast to Section 4, we now assume that budget rigidities merely limit
the extent to which scal policy parameters are adjustable and that they
a¤ect all policy parameters. On the one hand, they limit the number of
policy adjustments that are feasible over an extended period of time.9 This
is realistic: government capacity and political capital are inevitably limited
so that governments can only focus on few issues at a time. We count a
change in the tax rate  , an increase of one e¢ ciency parameter (1;2) and
two o¤setting changes in the composition of public setting (e.g. an increase
in 1 and a decrease in 2 so that 41 =  42) each as one policy change.
For simplicity, we assume that governments are only able to make one policy
adjustment. On the other hand, budget rigidities limit the magnitude of
9Obviously, there may be debate about what an extended period of timemeans in
an endogenous growth model with a continous time concept. We simply assume that the
period is su¢ ciently long in the sense that wrong policy choices have signicant adverse
welfare which the government cannot undo.
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each policy adjustment. While the degree of exibility of each scal policy
parameter di¤ers, we assume that budget rigidities are meaningful in the
sense that feasible policy adjustments do not allow a complete shift to the
optimal parameter values (otherwise, budget rigidities would not constrain
government policy). The largest feasible adjustments of 1;2,  and 1;2 in
absolute terms (denoted by a, a and a) are
a = r
1;2   1;2 (23)
a = r j     j (24)
a = r (1  1;2) (25)
where r; r ; r dene the exibility of each parameter and where
0 < r; r ; r < 1 (26)
(26) ensures that budget rigidities constrain scal policy parameters so that
they cannot be set at their optimal values (otherwise budget rigidities would
not be a constraint for scal policy).
In this type of situation, the policy problem is therefore to identify the
scal reform (i.e. the scal policy adjustment) which enhances growth most
and which is feasible under our specication of budget rigidities. Govern-
ments can either lower or raise 1 (o¤set by an adjustment of 2) by up to
a, they can raise or lower  by up to a , or they can raise 1 or 2 by up to
a, respectively. From (23), (24) and (25), the maximum feasible adjustment
is always smaller than the adjustment required to reach the optimal parame-
ter value which implies that it is optimal to adjust 1;2,  , or 1;2 by a, a ,
and a, respectively (i.e. by the largest feasible amount and not by less in
absolute terms). In other words, while there is an innite number of distinct
policy parameter adjustments, the policy problem is to choose one out of six
di¤erent ones (1
+
 a o¤set by corresponding changes in 2, 
+
 a , 1 + a
and 2 + a).10
10For simplicity, we assume that the initial values of  and 1;2 are su¢ ciently far away
from their minima (0) and their maxima (1) so that each of the policy adjustments could
in principle be implemented.
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Figure 8 shows the implications of di¤erent policy adjustments under
several scenarios. The objective is rst to illustrate the impact of comple-
mentarity on the change of the growth rate that results from alternative
scal reforms and second to show that under imperfect knowledge, the ex-
pected change of the growth rate is negative as shown further below. The
absolute magnitude of the policy adjustments considered depends on the as-
sumptions about budget rigidities and is given by j4 j = a ,
41;2 = a
and j41;2j = a. The scenarios di¤er with respect to the exibility of the
scal policy parameters, the initial values of the scal policy parameters and
the exogenous model parameters. Table 1 contains details about the scenar-
ios. In order to ensure comparability between the scenarios, the change of
the growth rate is expressed as a share of potential growth (i.e. the growth
rate under growth-maximizing scal policy in a rst-best situation). For in-
stance, under scenario 1 which assumes Cobb-Douglas technology and which
assumes  <  , 1 > 

1 and 1;2 < 1, raising the rate of taxation results
in the greatest increase of the growth rate (the growth rate increases by
about 5% in terms of potential growth), whereas lowering the tax rate re-
sults in a fall of the growth rate by about 14%. Comparing the changes of
the growth rate under scenarios 1 and 2 which only di¤er with respect to the
production technology (scenario 1 assumes Cobb-Douglas, whereas scenario
2 assumes CES technology) shows that complementarity between the inputs
to private production implies that scal reform has much greater e¤ects in
relative terms under CES technology. Comparing scenarios 2 and 4 shows
that obviously, the initial values of the scal policy parameters also impact
on the optimal policy adjustment.
Under imperfect knowledge, the government does not know the response
of the growth rate to policy parameter adjustments. Conceptually, it is useful
to distinguish two types of mistakes the government can make. First, it may
pick a policy adjustment which results in a reduction of the growth rate.
Second, it may pick a policy adjustment which enhances growth but to a
lesser extent compared to the case when the optimal policy adjustment is
chosen. Obviously, the priority is to avoid the rst mistake which can be
seen as more costly than the second one.
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Table 1: Scenarios
Scenario 1 2 3 4
1 0.15
2 0.15
 0 -1
 0.04
 1
 0
=  0.6 0.6 0.6 0.9
1=

1 1.15 1.15 1.15 0.9
1;2 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.5
r 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.7
r 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.7
r 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.6
A 1
How likely is it that the growth rate will decrease as a result of policy
parameter adjustments? While the government knows that increasing 1 and
2 unambiguously increases the growth rate, imperfect knowledge implies
that it has no information about   and 1;2 which means that it does not
know how changes of  and 1;2 a¤ect the growth rate (i.e. the government
does not know whether increasing or decreasing  and 1;2 raises the growth
rate). A risk-neutral imperfectly informed government will therefore assign
equal probability weights to either outcome (i.e. the government will assign
a probability of 1=2 to both an increase and a decrease of the growth rate as
a result of changing  and 1;2). These probabilities allow the calculation of
the expected change of the growth rate that results from adjusting  and 1;2
which is simply the average of the absolute increase and the absolute decrease
of the growth rate. Figure 8 implies that this average is unambiguously
negative for  and 1;2 in all scenarios. In other words, while the government
is unable to calculate the exact magnitude of the expected change of the
growth rate due to imperfect knowledge, it does know that the expected
change of the growth rate from adjusting  and 1;2 by a discrete amount is
negative. For instance, under scenario 2, the decrease of the growth rate that
results from decreasing  by a exceeds the increase of the growth rate that
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Figure 8: Changes of the growth rate as a result of scal policy adjustments
results from increasing  by a .
Figure 9 illustrates this point using a numerical example which assumes
Cobb-Douglas technology. It plots the growth rate as a function of =  (so
that at =  = 1, the tax rate is set at its rst-best value). Suppose that
the economy is initially at point A. Increasing the tax rate by a raises
the growth rate, and the economy attains point B, whereas in the opposite
case with a decrease in the rate of taxation, the growth rate falls to point
C. Imperfect knowledge implies that the government does not know whether
=  < 1 or =  > 1 (i.e. whether the tax rate is below or above its
optimal value). In other words, the government could equally assume that
the economy is at point A0 where lowering taxation results in a shift to point
B0 where the growth rate is higher. The concavity of the growth curve implies
that shifting the rate of taxation away from its optimal value has always a
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greater absolute impact on the growth rate than shifting the rate of taxation
towards its optimal value which explains why the expected change of the
growth rate is negative. This result only holds when the adjustment of  and
1;2 are discrete (i.e. non-marginal).
Figure 9: Possible changes of the growth rate as a result of tax rate adjust-
ments
The result of a negative expected change in the growth rate due to adjust-
ments of  and 1;2 is that imperfectly informed governments refrain from
adjusting them and therefore choose to increase k1;2 only. The reason is that
there is always full certainty that raising 1 and 2 will increase the growth
rate. However, as Figure 8 demonstrates, governments then risk to commit
the second mistake of not choosing the policy adjustment which increases the
growth rate most.
The solution for this dilemma is to exploit the fact that budget rigidities
constrain scal policy discretion and thereby reduce informational require-
ments to identify the optimal and feasible policy parameter adjustment. In
order to avoid growth-reducing adjustments, information about the growth-
enhancingdirection of the optimal adjustment of  and 1;2 is su¢ cient. This
information appears to be more readily available than information about the
exact values of the optimal policy parameters. Since budget rigidities imply
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that feasible policy adjustments are always smaller than policy adjustments
required to attain the optimal values of  and , governments do not require
information about the optimal magnitude which would arguably be much
harder to obtain. This allows governments to avoid the rst mistake for all
scal policy parameters.
Avoiding the second mistake then requires criteria to select the optimal
scal reform among those which augment the growth rate. This does not
require a comparison of the change in the growth rate of all policy adjust-
ments in absolute terms. Rather, under budget rigidities, it may be su¢ cient
to identify the policy adjustment which results in the largest increase of the
growth rate which implies that only a comparison of the change of the growth
rate in relative terms is required.
7 Conclusions
This paper has shown that Cobb-Douglas technology which is commonly as-
sumed in most endogenous growth models with public nance has in some
respect counterintuitive and misleading implications for growth-maximizing
scal policy. This paper has also justied that second-best situations are
likely to arise in the context of scal policy, and that with CES technology,
second-best interactions have important implications for optimal scal policy
under growth maximization. The main result here is that in second-best sit-
uations, the optimal level of taxation is likely higher, and the optimal share
of investment is lower compared to a rst-best situation. While in practice,
public infrastructure is often seen as particularly important for economic
development, this may only apply for a rst-best situation. A natural ex-
tension would be to derive the welfare-maximizing scal policy within the
same framework and compare the results to the growth-maximizing equiva-
lent which we however leave for future research. In the same way, a useful
extension of the model would be to examine whether second-best interactions
also alter the optimal allocation between public expenditure categories other
than those considered in this paper.
The paper has also considered the sources of divergence from a rst-best
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situations that give rise to a second-best one. In addition to budget rigidi-
ties, complexity is likely to exceed government capacity and expertise which
gives rise to imperfect knowledge. In turn, second-best interactions increase
informational requirements to determine the optimal values of scal policy
parameters further. However, our results also suggest that when scal policy
discretion is limited due to budget rigidities, informational requirements are
likely to decrease. In particular, in order to implement growth-enhancing
scal policy reforms, only the scal policy parameter to be adjusted and the
direction of the adjustment must be chosen. In contrast, the optimal mag-
nitude of scal policy adjustments or the second-best values of scal policy
parameters do typically not have to be known for the design of growth-
enhancing scal reforms.
It is interesting to contrast our analysis of scal reform with the one by
Ahmad and Stern (1984). Their objective is to identify welfare-improving
tax changes which do not decrease tax revenue. They develop a simple static
model with many goods which are all subject to specic taxes and which
are consumed by the households who receive xed and untaxed factor in-
comes. This framework enables to derive the marginal cost in terms of social
welfare of raising an additional unit of government revenue from taxing a
given good. If this marginal cost di¤ers for two goods, welfare-improving
tax reforms are feasible. Apart from the fact that they consider a welfare
function which takes into account value judgements whereas we assume that
aggregate growth is the objective function of the government, there are other
important di¤erences between their analysis and ours. First, our modelling
framework is di¤erent. Whereas they consider di¤erent types of indirect taxes
and implicitly take public spending requirements as exogenously given, we
consider income taxation, di¤erent public expenditure categories and model
the e¤ects of public spending which implies that the optimal level of public
spending is endogenously determined. Their condition for welfare-improving
tax reforms is therefore not directly applicable in the context of this paper.
Second, they consider the fact that their analysis is limited to the direction
of scal adjustments (and excludes the size) as a disadvantage. In contrast,
by explicitly modelling budget rigidities, we extend Ahmad and Stern (1984)
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in two important ways. On the one hand, we showed that the assumption
that only small scal policy adjustments are feasible is realistic. On the other
hand and more importantly, we presented compelling evidence that with con-
cave objective functions, information about the direction of scal adjustment
is most important.
A Appendix
A.1 Uniqueness and Stability of the Balanced Growth
Path
Let x = c
k
and z = G2
k
. Together with the transversality condition, lim
t!1
[k] =
0, and with the initial conditions, x0 > 0 and z0 > 0, the dynamics of the
market economy can be expressed as a system of two di¤erential equations
(we assume that i = 1):
_x
x
=
_c
c
 
_k
k
(A.1)
and
_z
z
=
_G2
G2
 
_k
k
(A.2)
From (8), (6) and (5), respectively,
_c
c
=
1

((1  )yk   ) (A.3)
_k
k
= (1  )y
k
  x (A.4)
_G2
G2
= 2
y
G2
(A.5)
Setting _x
x
= 0 in (A.1) and solving for x yields its steady state value, ~x:
~x = (1  )y
k
  1

((1  )yk   ) (A.6)
Using (A.6) to substitute for x in (A.4), and using (A.4) and (A.5) to sub-
stitute for _k
k
and _G2
G2
in (A.2) yields
F = 2
y
G2
  1

(1  )yk + 

(A.7)
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From (4) and (10),
G1
G2
=
1
2
 (A.8)
From (1) and (A.8),
y
G2
= (z  + 1

1
2


+ 2)
1
 (A.9)
Di¤erentiating (1) for k, using (4) to substitute for G1 and replacing G2k by
z yields
yk =

 + 1

1
y
k

+ 2z

 1

 1
 (A.10)
From (1) and (4),
y
k
=

 + 2z

(1  11)
 1

(A.11)
After using (A.11) to substitute in (A.10) and (A.9) and (A.10) to substitute
in (A.7), it can be seen that if   0, dF
dz
< 0 implying that F is a monoton-
ically decreasing function of z so that there is a unique positive value of ~z
that satises F = 0. From (A.6), there is a unique positive value of ~x as well.
Thus, the growth path is unique.
To investigate the dynamics in the vicinity of the unique steady state
equilibrium, equations (A.1) and (A.2) can be linearized to yield
_x
_z

=

a11 a12
a21 a22
 
x  ~x
z   ~z

(A.12)
where ~x and ~z denote the steady state values of x and z. From (A.1) and
(A.2), _x and _z can be rewritten as follows:
_x =
 
_c
c
 
_k
k
!
~x (A.13)
and
_z =
 
_G2
G2
 
_k
k
!
~z (A.14)
with _c
c
, _k
k
and _G2
G2
dened according to (A.3), (A.4) and (A.5). Saddlepoint
stability requires that the determinant of the Jacobian matrix of partial deriv-
atives of the dynamic system (A.12) must be negative:
det J = a11a22   a12a21 (A.15)
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Given the complexity of the matrix, it is easier to verify numerically that this
condition holds. For most sensible examples with sensible parameter values
that we used, this condition is satised.
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